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# Urban Government

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A Reader  
in Administration and Politics

Revised Edition

EDITED BY *Edward C. Banfield*  
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

1969

The Free Press, New York

Collier-Macmillan Limited, London

# Preface to the Revised Edition


IT IS astonishing how much has happened in and to the cities in the eight years since the first edition of this book appeared. There have been fundamental changes in public opinion (in 1961 the first civil rights revolutionaries had just begun to take their seats at segregated lunch counters), in the rules governing the electoral process (the first one-man one-vote bombshell had not yet burst), and in the techniques of management (planners were beginning to talk about benefit-cost ratios but few of them had ever set eyes on a computer). Not until I set about revising the book did I realize how much the situation had changed and how much it needed to be brought up to date.

The changes have not been such as to require changing the general character and plan of the book, however. I have retained the original structure, the intention of which is to place the materials within an analytical framework that will make their larger significance apparent to the student. The approach is also the same in that it is concerned with how urban government works rather than with rules-of-thumb for its improvement. The distribution of emphasis is much as it was except that I have enlarged Part VII, Problems of Management, to give a much fuller account of the various kinds of planning that are making their appearance in response to the growing scale and complexity of urban problems. My hope is that students of city planning will find it useful to have these materials brought together in one place.

I believe that about half the material in the book is new. I have not hesitated to retain articles that I consider classics (Norton Long's two, for example) or to print very long articles which could not be cut without serious injury (for example, the note from the *Harvard Law Review* on City Government in the State Courts). There are readings that are very up-to-date (on Negro politics, riots, and reapportionment of local government, for example) but I have not knowingly sacrificed anything of analytical importance for the sake of being topical.

All of the readings in the last Part are new. They all contribute to a single theme, of course—how policy is formed—but the reader should note that each of them contributes to other parts of the book as

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First Printing

well. Harold Kaplan's article on Metro Toronto, for example, adds something to the section on Metropolitan Organization, Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven's article on welfare adds something to the section on Influence and Leadership, and H. R. Wilde's article on the Milwaukee riot adds something to at least three sections: The Theory of Good Government, The Trend of Urban Politics, and Influence and Leadership. My own article on the public library might be read in connection with the section on Problems of Management.

The bibliography has been brought up to date and an index has been added.

## Preface to the First Edition

THIS IS a collection of the readings that I have found most valuable in teaching courses on urban government to both undergraduate and graduate students.

The readings come from so many places that even if each were readily available it would be a tedious task for a librarian to bring them all together on a reserve shelf. But many, like Henry Jones Ford's theory of corruption, would not be available at all in most libraries, and some, like Rexford G. Tugwell's evaluation of the career of Robert Moses, have never before appeared in print.

A book of this kind can be used in at least three ways: as a supplement to a textbook, in place of a textbook as an accompaniment to classroom lectures, or as a basis for a discussion series. It has been my experience that readings of this sort help give analytical depth to a course. The usual textbook provides a descriptive account of the more formal aspects of governmental structure and process, and then leaves it up to the instructor to show the student the larger meaning of what has been described. This book is designed to help him do this. Accordingly, I have selected the readings for the *ideas* that they contain.

Since some instructors will want to use the book without an accompanying text, the essential descriptive materials are supplied here in the form of a Glossary. Because the Glossary contains all of the background information necessary for understanding the readings, many students will find it useful to begin by reading the Glossary from start to finish.

The approach of this book differs from that of most texts in several respects. The most important difference, perhaps, is that this book tries to explain what really happens in urban government and to do so largely in terms of the concepts and theories of social scientists. Most textbooks on state and local government are preoccupied with what "experts" think *ought* to be the case; this one is occupied with what *really* is the case. While the views of reformers and experts are represented, they are not assumed to be authoritative, and they are placed in juxtaposition with the views of social scientists.

position with those of social scientists. Thus, for example, the student is exposed not only to the usual criticisms of the big city machine but also to the views of the eminent sociologist, Robert K. Merton, on the machine's latent functions.

This emphasis on the social scientist's view of things as they are, as distinguished from what they ought to be, has inevitably led to a much heavier emphasis on politics than is common in most textbooks on urban government. Works on urban government all too often assume that the tasks of city government are almost entirely matters of administration—collecting garbage, repairing streets, putting out fires, and so on. Without belittling the importance of such activities, this book seeks to give politics—the struggle for power and the management of conflict—the attention that it deserves.

Politics would be important even if it had no consequences extending beyond the boundaries of the city. But the fact is that American national politics is to a very large extent local politics, and no one can possibly understand the national political system without first understanding politics in the cities, especially the larger ones. This is another reason for the emphasis here on politics.

This book focuses on the processes rather than on the techniques of government. Most students, for example, do not need to know anything about the technique of designing and filling out the forms of a city budget. Not one in a thousand will ever have use for such information, and the rare one who will can certainly best get it on the job. On the other hand, all students should know the kinds of things that are explained by William H. Brown, Jr. and Charles E. Gilbert in their article on capital programming in Philadelphia: what capital programming is, why it is done, how it is organized, what its connection with city planning is, what its political setting is, and what are the practical and theoretical limitations upon its effectiveness.

Some of the readings provide models for students who would like to go into the local community and do research of their own. The selections from Mark K. Adams, James Q. Wilson, Robert A. Dahl, and Kenneth E. Gray and David Greenstone should all be suggestive to the student who wants to try his hand at this and to the class that is carrying on a joint research project. These examples show how much can be done without a computing machine, providing one has sound legs and a good mind.

Each Section of the book is preceded by an introductory note formulating the central questions around which it is organized, underlining the points that the editor believes are of the greatest analytical interest, and showing the relevance of each reading to the general themes of the book.

The bibliography lists items generally regarded as standard refer-

ences on each topic. These are annotated for the benefit of the non-specialist.

The author acknowledges with thanks the assistance of Martha Derthick, who prepared the Glossary and the Bibliography.

September, 1961

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# I

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## Urban Government as a Subject for Study

GOVERNMENT serves two very different functions. One is that of providing goods and services that cannot be, or at any rate are not, provided under other, private, auspices. With respect to this *service* function, government is in many ways like a private enterprise. Private enterprise provides certain kinds of goods and services to people called "customers"; public enterprise provides other kinds of goods and services to people called "taxpayers." Both types of enterprise are judged by how well and how cheaply they supply the goods and services that are wanted.

The other function of government is to deal with conflict. Wherever there are people, there are bound to be differences of opinion and of interest. Politics is any kind of activity—reasonable discussion, heated argument, bribery, fighting, balloting, and so on—by which conflict in matters of public importance is carried on. Government deals with this conflict by regulating the manner in which it is carried on, by arranging compromises and balancing interests, and by imposing settlements which the parties to the disputes have to accept.

Whereas the service function is of necessity performed consciously and deliberately, the political function is often, but not always, performed as a more or less accidental by-product of a politician's effort to get office or of a bureaucracy's effort to maintain and expand itself.

Perhaps it is for this reason that many people regard "administration," or the carrying out of the service function, as the "real" justification for government, while they look on "politics," or the process by which conflict is handled, as a necessary evil, if not indeed as an irrational aberration.

Because the service function is so conspicuously important in the government of cities, many writers have treated it as if it were, or ought to be, the *only* function of city government. The usual textbook emphasis on the service role of city government relies implicitly, and often explicitly, upon a conceptual scheme appropriate to the normative study of administration. This perspective introduces a bias that hides other, perhaps more significant, dimensions of governmental activity.

In some places, city government is indeed much more a matter of administration than of politics. This is true in Great Britain, and also in many small, middle-class American cities. In these places, matters are usually decided on grounds that are (or at least seem to be) technical rather than political. In large, polyglot American cities, however, the case is different. In such cities, efficiency—the avoidance of waste—is of little or no interest to many voters, and conflict among groups and interests is pervasive and sharp. Despite the pleas of reformers, the people with something at stake have never agreed either to respect the neutrality of administration and to leave certain matters out of politics or to forego advantages that could be had by mixing local issues with state and national ones.

But the political character of government in all of our larger and many of our smaller cities need not necessarily be considered pathological. The successful management of conflict is a social function valuable enough in itself to justify, as a rule, whatever loss of efficiency in the performance of the service functions the injection of politics into administration may cause.

The effective management of conflict is valuable because it permits and encourages the expression of competing interests and opinions while at the same time preventing the eruption of violence and the eventual breakdown of social organization. But even more important, it is valuable as a way of discovering the concrete content of the common good. Political struggle is the means by which society develops the meaning of justice and of good. This is so even when the particular matter in question—say, the location of a housing project—is in itself trivial. Even though a concrete matter may be trivial to start with, it is often transformed and given great significance by ideological or symbolic elements that are introduced to serve someone's purpose. Thus the agitation over what is a trivial matter to begin with may prove useful in the elucidation of moral questions of the deepest interest to all mankind. For Aristotle, whose categories Norton E. Long believes provide the most appropriate framework for the study of local government, the city is

above all an ethical association. It comes into existence (to paraphrase Aristotle slightly) for the sake of its service functions, but it exists for the sake of the good life. How to establish empirically the influence of "regime" on the style and content of a city's government is one of the problems discussed by James Q. Wilson in an article which stresses the importance of comparative studies. The final reading in this section, by Edward C. Banfield, represents an effort to apply the advice given here on what to study and how to study it. The article (1) treats "actions which increase conflict" (as opposed to persons) as the relevant unit of analysis, (2) is comparative, and (3) compares two conceptions of "citizen, constitution, and ruling class."

## The Management of Metropolitan Conflict

Edward C. Banfield

THE RAPID GROWTH of the metropolitan populations will not necessarily have much political effect. To be sure, many new facilities, especially schools, highways, and water supply and sewage disposal systems, will have to be built and much private activity will have to be regulated. But such things do not necessarily have anything to do with politics: the laying of a sewer pipe by a "public" body may involve the same kinds of behavior as the manufacture of the pipe by a "private" one. Difficulties that are "political" arise (and they may arise in "private" as well as in "public" undertakings) only in so far as there is conflict—conflict over what the common good requires or between what it requires and what private interests want. The general political situation is affected, therefore, not by changes in population density or in the number and complexity of the needs that government serves ("persons," the human organisms whose noses are counted by census-takers, are not necessarily "political actors") but rather by actions which increase conflict in matters of public importance or make the management of it more difficult. In what follows, such actions will be called "burdens" upon the political system.

In judging how a political system will work over time, increases and decreases in the burdens upon it are obviously extremely relevant. They are not all that must be considered, however. Changes in the "capability" of a system, that is, in its ability to manage conflict and to impose settlements, are equally relevant. The "effectiveness" of a political system is a ratio between burdens and capability. Even though the burdens upon it increase, the effectiveness of a system will also increase if there is a sufficient accompanying increase in its capability. Similarly, even though there is an increase in capability, the effectiveness of a system will decrease if there is a more than commensurate increase in burdens.

Reprinted by permission from DAEDALUS, The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 90 (Winter 1960), pp. 61-78.

In this article an impressionistic account will be given with respect to two contrasting political systems, the British and the American, of the burdens metropolitan affairs place upon them and of their changing capabilities. Naturally, the focus of attention will be upon ratios of burdens to capabilities and upon the significance of these ratios for metropolitan affairs.

### The Tasks of British Local Government

Until recently British local government (meaning not only government that is locally controlled but all government that deals with local affairs) had, by American standards, very little to do. Until three or four years ago there was little traffic regulation in Britain because there were few cars (the first few parking meters, all set for two hours, were installed in London in the summer of 1958). Now all of a sudden there are 5,500,000 cars—more per mile of road than in any other country—and the number is increasing by a net of 1,500 per day; by 1975 there are expected to be 13,500,000. Obviously, the need for roads and parking places will be enormous. But the automobile will create other and graver problems for local government. When there are enough cars and highways, there will doubtless be a "flight to the suburbs." The central business districts will be damaged, and so will mass transit (94 percent of those who now enter London do so by public transportation) and the green belts.<sup>1</sup>

Law enforcement has been relatively easy in Britain up to now. The British have not been culturally disposed toward violence or toward the kinds of vice that lead to major crimes. (There are only 450 dope addicts in all of Britain, whereas in Chicago alone there are from 12,000 to 15,000.) British opinion, moreover, has not demanded that some forms of vice be made illegal, much less that vice in general be suppressed. In England adultery is not illegal, and neither is prostitution, although it is illegal to create a nuisance by soliciting. Physicians in England may prescribe dope to addicts. (In the United States, where this is illegal, black-market prices prevail and the addict must usually resort to crime

1. Dame Evelyn Sharp, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Local Government, recently pointed out that the expected population increase in England and Wales in the next 15 years (nearly three million) is almost double the increase on which plans have been based. The number of separate households, moreover, is growing faster than the number of people. Much of the demand for new housing, she said, is demand for better and more spacious housing. All this has increased the pressure on land, especially on the green belt, and particularly around London. The Government policy, she said, was to encourage the building of houses for owner occupation, and how to follow this without wrecking the effort to preserve the green belt was one of the most difficult problems facing the planning authorities. She said there were also increasing demands on land by industry, for great new roads, car parking and garaging and for power. *The Times*, 23 October 1959.

to support his habit. In Chicago a week's supply of heroin costs at least \$105; to realize this much, the addict must steal goods worth about \$315. According to the estimate of a criminal court judge, about \$50 million worth of goods is shoplifted every year in the central business district of Chicago by addicts.<sup>2</sup>) Never having tried to suppress drinking, gambling, or prostitution, the British have no organized crime.

The task of law enforcement is also becoming more difficult, however. Dope addiction, and consequently crimes of violence, will increase with the number of West Indians and others who are not culturally at home in England. In the past year the horde of London prostitutes has been driven underground, where they may prove a powerful force tending toward the corruption of the police.<sup>3</sup> As traffic fines increase in number and amount, the bribery of the police by motorists will also increase. "All Britain's big cities," an *Observer* writer recently said, "now have enclaves of crime where the major masculine trades appear to be pimping and dealing in dubious second-hand cars."<sup>4</sup>

Even if motorists, dope addicts, and prostitutes do not seriously corrupt it, the police force is bound to deteriorate. The British have had extraordinarily fine policemen, partly because their social system has hitherto offered the working class few better opportunities. As it becomes easier to rise out of the working class, the police force will have to get along with less desirable types. It is significant that the Metropolitan Police are now 3,000 men short.

State-supported schooling, one of the heaviest tasks of local government in the United States, has been a comparatively easy one in Britain. Four out of five British children leave school before the age of 16. The British, it is said, are not likely to develop a taste for mass education.<sup>5</sup> They are demanding more and better state-supported schools, however, and no doubt the government will have to do more in this field.

It would be wrong to infer that because of these changes the burden upon the British political system will henceforth be comparable to that upon our own or, indeed, that it will increase at all. Conceivably, the new tasks of local government will have no more political significance than would, say, a doubling of the volume of mail to be carried by the post office. One can imagine, for example, two opposite treatments of the London traffic problem, one of which would solve the problem with-

out creating any burden upon the political system and the other of which would leave the problem unsolved while creating a considerable burden.

Possibility 1. The Ministry of Transport takes jurisdiction over London traffic. Acting on the recommendations of a Royal Commission, the Minister declares that the central city will be closed to private automobiles. His decision is acclaimed as wise and fair—"the only thing to do"—by everyone who matters.

Possibility 2. The boroughs retain their control over traffic because the Minister is mindful of organized motorists. People feel that it is an outrageous infringement of the rights of Englishmen to charge for parking on the Queen's highway or to fine a motorist without having first served a summons upon him in the traditional manner. Traffic is unrelated, and everyone complains bitterly.

As this suggests, "governmental tasks" are "political burdens" only if public opinion makes them so. What would be an overwhelming burden in one society may not be any burden at all in another. What may not be a burden upon a particular political system at one time may become one at another. It is essential to inquire, therefore, what changes are occurring in the way such matters are usually viewed in Great Britain and in the United States. The factors that are particularly relevant in this connection include: the intensity with which ends are held and asserted; the willingness of actors to make concessions, to subordinate private to public interests, and to accept arbitration; and, finally, the readiness of the voters to back the government in imposing settlements.

## The Relation of Citizen to Government

The British have a very different idea from ours of the proper relation between government and citizens. They believe that it is the business of the government to govern. The voter may control the government by giving or withholding consent, but he may not participate in its affairs. The leader of the majority in the London County Council, for example, has ample power to carry into effect what he and his policy committee decide upon; it is taken for granted that he will make use of his power (no one will call him a boss for doing so) and that he will not take advice or tolerate interference from outsiders.

Locally as well as nationally, British government has been in the hands of the middle and upper classes. Civil servants, drawn of course entirely from the middle class, have played leading and sometimes dominant roles. Most elected representatives have been middle or upper class. The lower class has not demanded, and apparently has not wanted, to be governed by its own kind or to have what in the United States is called "recognition." Although Labour has controlled the London County Council since 1934, there have never been in the

2. These facts were supplied by Dr. Arnold Abrams of Chicago in a private communication.

3. The Wolfenden Committee considered this possibility and concluded that the measures it proposed (chiefly to make it easier for police officers to establish "annoyance") justified the risk. Its measures, the Committee said, were not "likely to result in markedly increased corruption. There are other fields of crime where the temptation to the police to succumb to bribery is, and will continue to be, much stronger than it is here." *Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution*, Cmnd. 247, September 1957, p. 96.

4. "Table Talk," *The Observer*, 15 May 1960.

5. Sir Geoffrey Crowther, "English and American Education," *The Atlantic*, April 1960.

Council any such gaudy representatives of the gutter as, for example, Alderman "Paddy" Bauler of Chicago. The unions have kept people with lower-class attributes, and sometimes people of lower-class origins as well, off the ballot. They would not have done so, of course, if the lower class had had a powerful itch to have its own kind in office. (In that case the unions would themselves have been taken over by the lower class.) As Bagehot said in explaining "deferential democracy," "the numerical majority is ready, is eager to delegate its power of choosing its ruler to a certain select minority."<sup>6</sup>

The ordinary man's contact with government inspires him with awe and respect. (Is government respected because it pertains to the upper classes, or does causality run the other way, the upper classes being respected because of their association with government?) "The English workingman," an Englishman who read an earlier draft of this article said, "seems to think that the assumption of governmental responsibilities calls for the solemnest of blue suits. They tend to be so overawed by their position as to be silenced by it."

The ethos of governing bodies, then, has been middle or upper class, even when most of their members have been lower class. So has that of the ordinary citizen when, literally or figuratively, he has put on his blue suit to discharge his "governmental responsibilities" at the polls.

Consequently the standards of government have been exclusively those of the middle and upper classes. There has been great concern for fair play, great respect for civil rights, and great attention to public amenities—all matters dear to middle- and upper-class hearts. At the same time there has been entire disregard for the convenience and tastes of the working man. London pubs, for example, are required by law to close from two until six in the afternoon, not, presumably, because no one gets thirsty between those hours or because drinking then creates a special social problem, but merely because the convenience of pub keepers (who would have to remain open if competition were allowed to operate) is placed above that of their customers. Similarly, trains and buses do not leave the center of London after eleven at night, not presumably, because no one wants to go home later, but because the people who make the rules deem it best for those who cannot afford taxis to get to bed early.

It is not simply class prejudice that accounts for these things. By common consent of the whole society the tastes of the individual count for little against prescriptive rights. When these rights pertain to the body politic—to the Crown, in the mystique—then the tastes of the individual may be disregarded entirely. Public convenience becomes everything; private convenience nothing.

As heirs of this tradition, the British town planners are in a fortunate position. They do not have to justify their schemes by consumers' preferences. It is enough for them to show that "public values"

6. Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, ch. IX.

are served, for by common consent any gain in a public value, however small, outweighs any loss of consumers' satisfaction, however large. Millions of acres of land outside of London were taken to make a green belt without anyone's pointing out that workmen are thus prevented from having small places in the country and that rents in the central city are forced up by the reduction in the supply of land. It is enough that a public amenity is being created (an amenity, incidentally, which can be enjoyed only by those having time and money to go out of London). The planning authorities of the London County Council, to cite another example of the general disregard for consumers' tastes, consider the following questions, among others, when they pass upon an application to erect a structure more than 100 feet in height:

Would it spoil the skyline of architectural groups or landscapes? Would it have a positive visual or civic significance? Would it relate satisfactorily to open spaces and the Thames? Would its illuminations at night detract from London's night scene?

It is safe to say that the planners do not weigh the value of a gain in "visual significance" against the value of a loss in "consumer satisfaction." In all probability they do not try to discover what preferences the consumer actually has in the matter. Certainly they do not make elaborate market analyses such as are customarily used in the United States in planning not only shopping places but even public buildings.

Green belts and the control of the use of land are only part of a plan of development which includes the creation of a dozen satellite towns, "decanting" the population of the metropolis, and much else. Where these sweeping plans have not been realized, it has not been because of political opposition. There has been virtually no opposition to any of these undertakings. The real estate, mercantile, banking, taxpayer, and labor union interests, which in an American city would kill such schemes before they were started, have not even made gestures of protest. The reason is not that none of them is adversely affected. It is that opposition would be futile.<sup>7</sup>

## The Direction of Change

Obviously, a political system that can do these things can do much else besides. If the relation between government and citizen in the next half century is as it has been in the past, the "govern-

7. An English friend comments: "I think you underestimate the sensitivity of central government to local or even private pressures. Parliamentary questions and debates, M.P.'s correspondence, lobbying, etc., provide plenty of opportunity for needling Ministers. The difference [between American and British practice] is, I think, that in Britain the government is not necessarily deflected by the pressures although it does its best to placate them. It does not ride rough-shod over protests; it lumbers on, writhing under the criticism and dispensing half-baked compromises."

mental tasks" that were spoken of above will not prove to be "political burdens" of much weight. One can hardly doubt, for example, which of the two ways of handling London traffic would, on this assumption, be more probable.

There is reason to think, however, that fundamental changes are occurring in the relations between government and citizen. Ordinary people in Britain are entering more into politics, and public opinion is becoming more ebullient, restive, and assertive. The lower class no longer feels exaggerated respect for its betters,<sup>8</sup> and if, as seems reasonable to assume, respect for public institutions and for political things has been in some way causally connected with respect for the governing classes, the ordinary man's attachment to his society may be changing in a very fundamental way. British democracy is still deferential, but it is less so than a generation ago, and before long it may be very little so.

It would not be surprising if the lower class were soon to begin wanting to have its own kind in office. Lower-class leaders would not necessarily be less mindful of the common good and of the principles of fair play than are the present middle and upper classes, however. The ethos of the British lower class may not be as different from that of the other classes as we in America, judging others by ourselves, are likely to imagine.

There is in Britain a tendency to bring the citizen closer to the process of government. Witness, for example, a novel experiment (as the *Times* described it) tried recently by an urban district council. At the conclusion of its monthly meeting, the council invited the members of the public present (there were about twenty) to ask questions. According to the *Times*,<sup>9</sup>

The Council, having decided to cast themselves into the arms of the electorate, had obviously given some thought to how they could extricate themselves if the hug became an uncomfortable squeeze. The chairman, after expressing the hope that the experiment would be successful, suggested a few rules. It was undesirable, he said, that such a meeting should become an ordinary debate with members of the public debating with members of the council and perhaps members of the council debating with each other. He decreed that the public should be restricted to questions on policy or factual information. He finished the preliminaries by saying that if things got out of hand he would rise and would then expect all further discussion to cease.

This last precaution proved to be unnecessary. The public were

8. Such an incident as the following, which is supposed to have occurred about the time of the First World War, would be inconceivable today: Hulme [the poet] was making water in Soho Square in broad daylight when a policeman came up. "You can't do that here." Hulme: "Do you realize you're addressing a member of the middle class?" at which the policeman murmured, "Beg pardon, sir," and went on his beat. Christopher Hassall, *Edward Marsh, Patron of the Arts: A Biography* (London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1959), p. 187.

9. The *Times*, 24 November 1959.

pertinent, probing, and shrewd in their questions, but content to observe the proprieties. The more vexed of domestic questions of Nantwich (the demolition of old property, road repairs, housing, and the like) were thrown down quickly and in every case received reasoned replies. The atmosphere of the chamber continued to be one of high good humor.

Carried far enough, this kind of thing would lead to the radical weakening of government. (There is no use giving people information unless you are going to listen to their opinions. And if you do that, you are in trouble, for their opinions are not likely to be on public grounds, and they are virtually certain to conflict.) The British are not likely to develop a taste for what in American cant is called "grass-roots democracy," however; the habit of leaving things to the government and of holding the government responsible is too deeply ingrained for that. What the public wants is not the privilege of participating in the process of government but, as the Franks Committee said, "openness, fairness, and impartiality" in official proceedings.<sup>10</sup>

The tastes of the ordinary man (consumers' preferences) will be taken more into account in the future than they have been in the past, not because the ordinary man will demand it (he may in time, but he is far from doing so now) but because the ruling elite—an elite that will be more sophisticated in such things than formerly—will think it necessary and desirable. The efforts of the Conservative government to let the market allocate housing are a case in point. These have been motivated, not by desire to deprive the workingman of advantages he has had for half a century (that would be out of the question), but by awareness that people's tastes may be best served in a market. The cherished green belts are now being scrutinized by people who are aware of consumer demand for living space, and some planners are even beginning to wonder if there is not something to be said for the American system of zoning. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the British will exchange their system of controls of the use of land, which as it stands allows the planner to impose a positive conception, for something resembling ours, which permits the user of land to do as he pleases so long as he does not violate a rule of law.

The conclusion seems warranted that twenty or thirty years from now, when today's children have become political actors, governmental tasks which would not place much of a burden on the political system may then place a considerable one on it. Governmental tasks like traffic regulation will be more burdensome politically both because there will be insistent pressure to take a wider range of views and interests into account, but also, and perhaps primarily, because the ruling group will have become convinced that the preferences of

10. *Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries*, Cmnd. 218, July 1958.

ordinary people ought to count for a great deal even when "public values" are involved. It is not impossible that the elite may come to attach more importance to the preferences of ordinary people than will the ordinary people themselves.

### The Contrasting American Tradition

Local government in the United States presents a sharply contrasting picture. It has been required to do a great deal, and the nature of American institutions and culture has made almost all of its tasks into political burdens.

Although there have always been among us believers in strong central government, our governmental system, as compared to the British, has been extraordinarily weak and decentralized. This has been particularly true of state and local government. The general idea seems to have been that no one should govern, or failing that, that everyone should govern together. The principle of checks and balances and the division of power, mitigated in the Federal government by the great powers of the presidency, were carried to extreme lengths in the cities and states. As little as fifty years ago, most cities were governed by large councils, some of them bicameral, and by mayors who could do little but preside over the councils. There was no such thing as a state administration. Governors were ceremonial figures only, and state governments were mere congeries of independent boards and commissions. Before anything could be done, there had to occur a most elaborate process of give and take (often, alas, in the most literal sense) by which bits and pieces of power were gathered up temporarily, almost momentarily.

It was taken for granted that the ordinary citizen had a right—indeed, a sacred duty—to interfere in the day-to-day conduct of public affairs. Whereas in Britain the press and public have been excluded from the deliberations of official bodies, in the United States it has been common practice to require by law that all deliberations take place in meetings open to the public. Whereas in Britain the electorate is never given an opportunity to pass upon particular projects by vote, in the United States it usually is. In Los Angeles, according to James Q. Wilson, "The strategy of political conflict is more often than not based upon the assumption that the crucial decision will be made not by the City Council of Los Angeles, the Board of Supervisors of the county, or the legislature of the state, but by the voters in a referendum election."<sup>11</sup>

11. James Q. Wilson, *A Report on Politics in Los Angeles*, Joint Center for Urban Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1959, pp. 1-13.

Los Angeles is an extreme case, but the general practice of American cities, a practice required by law in many of them, is to get the voters' approval of major expenditures. The New York City government, one of the strongest, is now having to choose between building schools and making other necessary capital expenditures; it cannot do both because the voters of the state have refused to lift the constitutional limit on debt. Such a thing could not happen in London; there all such decisions are made by the authorities, *none of whom is elected at large*.

The government of American cities has for a century been almost entirely in the hands of the working class.<sup>12</sup> This class, moreover, has had as its conception of a desirable political system one in which people are "taken care of" with jobs, favors, and protection, and in which class and ethnic attributes get "recognition." The idea that there are values, such as efficiency, which pertain to the community as a whole and to which the private interests of individuals ought to be subordinated has never impressed the working-class voter.

The right of the citizen to have his wishes, whether for favors, "recognition," or something else, served by local government, has been an aspect of the generally privileged position of the consumer. If the British theory has been that any gain in public amenity, however small, is worth any cost in consumer satisfaction, however large, ours has been the opposite: with us, any gain to the consumer is worth any cost to the public. What the consumer is not willing to pay for is not of much value in our eyes. Probably most Americans believe that if the consumer prefers his automobile to public transportation his taste ought to be respected, even if it means the destruction of the cities.

We have, indeed, gone far beyond the ideal of admitting everyone to participation in government and of serving everyone's tastes. We have made public affairs a game which anyone may play by acting "as if" he has something at stake, and these make-believe interests become subjects of political struggle just as if they were real. "The great game of politics" has for many people a significance of the same sort as, say, the game of business or the game of social mobility. All, in fact, are parts of one big game. The local community, as Norton E. Long has maintained in a brilliant article, may be viewed as an ecology of games: the games serve certain social functions (they provide determinate goals and calculable strategies, for example, and this gives an element of coordination to what would otherwise be a

12. A couple of generations ago politics was literally the principal form of mass entertainment. See Mayor Curley's account of the Piano-Smashing Contest, Peg-leg Russell, the greased-pig snatch and other such goings-on at Caledonian Grove. When the working class could pay more than twenty-five cents for its all-day family outing, it went to Fenway Park and baseball pushed politics into second place. James M. Curley, *I'd Do It Again!* (New York, Prentice Hall, 1957), pp. 54-55.

chaotic pull and haul), but the real satisfaction is in "playing the game."<sup>13</sup>

Since the American political arena is more a playground than a forum, it is not surprising that, despite the expenditure of vast amounts of energy, problems often remain unsolved—after all, what is really wanted is not solutions but the fun of the game. Still less is it surprising that those in authority seldom try to make or impose comprehensive solutions. The mayor of an American city does not think it appropriate for him to do much more than ratify agreements reached by competing interest groups. For example, the mayor of Minneapolis does not, according to a recent report, "actively sponsor anything. He waits for private groups to agree on a project. If he likes it, he endorses it. Since he has no formal power with which to pressure the Council himself, he feels that the private groups must take the responsibility for getting their plan accepted."<sup>14</sup>

American cities, accordingly, seldom make and never carry out comprehensive plans. Plan making is with us an idle exercise, for we neither agree upon the content of a "public interest" that ought to override private ones nor permit the centralization of authority needed to carry a plan into effect if one were made. There is much talk of the need for metropolitan-area planning, but the talk can lead to nothing practical because there is no possibility of agreement on what the "general interest" of such an area requires concretely (whether, for example, it requires keeping the Negroes concentrated in the central city or spreading them out in the suburbs) and because, anyway, there does not exist in any area a government that could carry such plans into effect.<sup>15</sup>

## Change in the United States

The relation of the citizen to the government is changing in the United States as it is in Britain. But the direction of our development is opposite to that of the British: whereas their government is becoming more responsive to popular opinion and therefore weaker, ours is becoming less responsive and therefore stronger. In state and

local government this trend has been under way for more than a generation and it has carried far. Two-thirds of our smaller cities are now run by professional managers, who, in routine matters at least, act without much interference. In the large central cities, mayors have wider spheres of authority than they did a generation ago, much more and much better staff assistance (most of them have deputies for administrative management), and greater freedom from the electorate. These gains are in most cases partly offset, and in some perhaps more than partly, by the decay of party machines, which could turn graft, patronage, and other "gravy" into political power, albeit power that was seldom used to public advantage.

Reformers in America have struggled persistently to strengthen government by overcoming the fragmentation of formal authority which has afflicted it from the beginning. The council manager system, the executive budget, metropolitan area organization—these have been intended more to increase the ability of government to get things done (its capability, in the terminology used above) than to make it less costly or less corrupt.<sup>16</sup>

One of the devices by which power has been centralized and the capability of government increased is the special function district or authority. We now commonly use authorities to build and manage turnpikes, airports and ports, redevelopment projects and much else. They generally come into being because the jurisdictions of existing general-purpose governments do not coincide with the areas for which particular functions must be administered. But if this reason for them did not exist, they would have to be created anyway, for they provide a way of escaping to a considerable extent the controls and interferences under which government normally labors. The authority, as a rule, does not go before the electorate or even the legislature; it is exempt from the usual civil-service requirements, budget controls, and auditing, and it is privileged to conduct its affairs out of sight of the public.

The success of all these measures to strengthen government is to be explained by the changing class character of the urban electorate. The lower-class ideal of government, which recognized no community larger than the ward and measured advantages only in favors, "gravy," and nationality "recognition," has almost everywhere gone out of fashion. To be a Protestant and a Yankee is still a political handicap in every large Northern city, but to be thought honest, public-spirited, and in some degree statesmanlike is now essential. (John E. Powers, the candidate expected by everyone to win the 1959 Boston mayoralty election, lost apparently because he fitted too well an image of the Irish politician that the Irish electorate found embarrassing and wanted to repudiate.) Many voters still want "nationality recognition," it has

16. See Don K. Price, "The Promotion of the City Manager Plan," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter 1941, pp. 563-578.

13. Norton E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1958, 64: 252.

14. Alan Altschuler, *A Report on Politics in Minneapolis* (Cambridge, Joint Center for Urban Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1959), pp. 11-14. The writer has described the posture of Mayor Daley of Chicago, the undisputed boss of a powerful machine, in similar terms. This suggests that it is not lack of power so much as a sense of what is seemingly that prevents American mayors from taking a strong line. See E. C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York, The Free Press, 1960), ch. 9.

15. See E. C. Banfield and M. Grodzins, *Government and Housing in Metropolitan Areas*, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1958), esp. chs. 3 and 4.

been remarked, but they want a kind that is flattering.<sup>17</sup> It appears to follow from this that the nationality-minded voter prefers a candidate who has the attributes of his group but has them in association with those of the admired Anglo-Saxon model. The perfect candidate is of Irish, Polish, Italian, or Jewish extraction, but has the speech, dress, and manner and also the public virtues (honesty, impartiality, devotion to the public good) that belong in the public mind to the upper class Anglo-Saxon.

The ascendant middle-class ideal of government emphasizes "public values," especially impartiality, consistency, and efficiency. The spread of the council-manager system and of nonpartisanship, the short ballot, at-large voting, and the merit system testify to the change.

Middle-class insistence upon honesty and efficiency has raised the influence and prestige of professionals in the civil service and in civic associations. These are in a position nowadays to give or withhold a good government "seal of approval" which the politician must display on his product.

The impartial expert who "gets things done" in spite of "politicians" and "pressure groups" has become a familiar figure on the urban scene and even something of a folk hero, especially among the builders, contractors, realtors, and bankers who fatten from vast construction projects.<sup>18</sup> Robert Moses is the outstanding example, but there are many others in smaller bailiwicks. The special function district or

17. In a study of politics in Worcester, Massachusetts, Robert H. Binstock has written: "Israel Katz, like Casdin, is a Jewish Democrat now serving his fourth term on the Worcester City Council. Although he is much more identifiably Jewish than Casdin, he gets little ethnic support at the polls; there is a lack of rapport between him and the Jewish voter. The voter apparently wants to transcend many features of his ethnic identification and therefore rejects candidates who fit the stereotype of the Jew too well. Casdin is an assimilated Jew in Ivy-League clothes; Katz, by contrast, is old world rather than new, clannish rather than civic-minded, and penny-pinching rather than liberal. Non-Jews call Katz a "character," Casdin a "leader." It is not too much to say that the Jews, like other minorities, want a flattering, not an unflattering, mirror held up to them. (Robert H. Binstock, *A Report on the Politics of Worcester*, Joint Center for Urban Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, forthcoming, 1960, Section II, B, 2.)

18. "In our political or business or labor organizations," Robert E. Sherwood observes in his account of Roosevelt and Hopkins, "we are comforted by the knowledge that at the top is a Big Boss whom we are free to revere or to hate and upon whom we can depend for quick decisions when the going gets tough. The same is true of our Boy Scout troops and our criminal gangs. It is most conspicuously true of our passion for competitive sport. We are trained from childhood to look to the coach for authority in emergencies. The master-minding coach who can send in substitutes with instructions whenever he feels like it—or even send in an entirely new team—is a purely-American phenomenon. In British football the team must play through the game with the same eleven men with which it started and with no orders from the sidelines; if a man is injured and forced to leave the field the team goes on playing with only ten men. In British sport, there are no Knute Rocknes or Connie Macks, whereas in American sport the mastermind is considered as an essential in the relentless pursuit of superiority." Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 39.

authority is, of course, their natural habitat; without the protection it affords from the electorate they could not survive.

The professionals, of course, favor higher levels of spending for public amenities. Their enlarged influence might in itself lead to improvements in the quality and quantity of goods and services provided publicly. But the same public opinion that has elevated the professional has also elevated the importance of these publicly supplied goods and services. It is the upper middle- and the lower-class voters who support public expenditure proposals (the upper middle-class voters because they are mindful of "the good of the community" and the lower-class ones because they have everything to gain and nothing to lose by public expenditures); lower middle-class voters, who are worried about mortgage payments, hostile toward the lower class (which threaten to engulf them physically and otherwise), and indifferent to community-regarding values, constitute most of the opposition to public improvements of all kinds.

Thus it happens that as Britain begins to entertain doubts about green belts, about controls of the use of land that make much depend upon the taste of planners, and about treating public amenity as everything and consumer satisfaction as nothing, we are moving in the opposite direction. There is a lively demand in the United States for green belts (the *New York Times* recently called "self-evident truth" the astonishing statement of an economist that "it is greatly to be doubted if any unit of government under any circumstances has ever bought or can ever buy too much recreation land");<sup>19</sup> the courts are finding that zoning to secure aesthetic values is a justifiable exercise of the police power; performance zoning, which leaves a great deal to the discretion of the planner, is becoming fashionable, and J. K. Galbraith has made it a part of conventional wisdom to believe that much more of the national income should be spent for public amenities.

Perhaps in the next twenty or thirty years municipal affairs will pass entirely into the hands of honest, impartial, and nonpolitical "experts"; at any rate, this seems to be the logical fulfillment of the middle-class ideal. If the ideal is achieved, the voters will accept, from a sense of duty to the common good, whatever the experts say is required. We may see in the present willingness of business and civic leaders to take at face value the proposals being made by professionals for master planning, metropolitan organization, and the like, and, in the exalted position of Robert Moses of New York, portents of what is to come.

The presence in the central cities of large numbers of Negroes,

19. *New York Times*, editorial, 11 April 1960. The economist was Dr. Marion Clawson of Resources for the Future, whose statement appeared in a report sponsored by the New York Metropolitan Regional Council and the New York Regional Plan Association.

Puerto Ricans, and white hillbillies creates a crosscurrent of some importance. For a generation, at least, these newcomers will prefer the old style politics of the ward boss and his "gravy train." How this anomaly will fit into the larger pattern of middle-class politics is hard to imagine. Possibly the lower class will simply be denied representation. And possibly the rate of increase of per capita income being what it is, the assimilation of these people into the middle class will take place faster than anyone now imagines.

## Summary and Conclusions

It has been argued in this paper that the tasks a government must perform (the number and complexity of goods and services it must supply) have no necessary relation to political matters. Tasks may increase without accompanying increase in the burden placed upon a political system. The important questions for political analysis, therefore, concern not population density or other indicators of the demand for goods and services, but rather the amount and intensity of conflict and the capacity of the government for managing it. Looked at from this standpoint, it appears that the effectiveness of British government in matters of local concern will probably decrease somewhat over the long run. The demands that will be made upon it in the next generation will be vastly more burdensome than those of the recent past (although also vastly less burdensome than the same demands would be in America), and the capacity of the government will be somewhat less. The effectiveness of local government in the United States, on the other hand, will probably increase somewhat. Local government has had more tasks to perform here than in Britain, and these have imposed enormously greater burdens. The tasks of local government will doubtless increase here too in the next generation, but the burdens they impose will probably decline. American local government is becoming stronger and readier to assert the paramountcy of the public interest, real or alleged.

Although each system has moved a considerable distance in the direction of the other, they remain far apart and each retains its original character. The British, although more sensitive to public opinion, still believe that the government should govern. And we, although acknowledging that the development of metropolitan areas should be planned, still believe that everyone has a right to "get in on the act" and to make his influence felt. Obviously, the differences are crucial, and although the trend seems to be toward greater effectiveness here and toward reduced effectiveness in Britain, there can be no doubt that in absolute terms the effectiveness of the British system is

and will remain far greater than that of ours. Despite the increase in the tasks it must perform, the burden upon it will remain low by American standards, and its capability will remain high. Matters which would cause great political difficulty here will probably be easily settled there.

The basic dynamic principle in both systems has not been change in population density but rather change in class structure. It is the relaxation of the bonds of status that has caused the British workingman to enter more into politics, that has made his tastes and views count for more, and that has raised questions about the right of an elite to decide matters. In America the assimilation of the lower class to the middle class and the consequent spread of an ideal of government which stresses honesty, impartiality, efficiency, and regard for public as well as private interest have encouraged the general strengthening of government.

The mere absence of dispute, acrimony, unworkable compromise, and stalemate (this, after all, is essentially what the concept "effectiveness" refers to in this connection) ought not, of course, to be taken as constituting a "good" political order. Arrogant officials may ignore the needs and wishes of ordinary citizens, and the ordinary citizens may respectfully acquiesce in their doing so, either because they think (as the British lower class does) that the gentleman knows best or (as the American middle class does) that the expert knows best. In such cases there may be great effectiveness—no dispute, no acrimony, no unworkable compromise, no stalemate—but far from signifying that the general welfare is being served, such a state of affairs signifies instead that the needs and wishes with which welfare under ordinary circumstances, especially in matters of local concern, is largely concerned are not being taken into account. To say, then, that our system is becoming somewhat more and the British system somewhat less effective does not by any means imply "improvement" for us and the opposite for them. It is quite conceivable that dispute, acrimony, unworkable compromise, and stalemate may be conspicuous features of any situation that approximates the idea of general welfare.

Such conclusions, resting as they do on rough and, at best, common-sense assessments, amply illustrate the difficulty of prediction, and—since the causal principles lie deep in social structure and in culture—the utter impossibility within a free society of a foresighted control of such matters.

## II

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# Urban Government in the Federal System

In a country as vast as the United States, a central government cannot very well carry on all public affairs. Some functions must be performed on a local basis and some on a more-than-local-but-less-than-national one. But although some such division of labor may be an evident necessity, the principles of it—and still less the concrete application of the principles—have never been easy to decide upon. Where the boundaries of the local and of the more-than-local-but-less-than-national jurisdictions should be drawn and what activities should be carried on within each of them are questions that have had to be agitated, discussed, and settled anew by each generation. The rate of social change, as well as the nature of the change, has made impossible any permanent or generally satisfactory answers.

Everyone agrees that local questions should be decided locally. And everyone agrees that when the two interests conflict, the interest of a local public should be subordinate to that of a larger one. But in their practical application these two principles have continually clashed, and efforts to formulate a workable compromise in abstract terms have again and again come to nothing. Part of the difficulty derives from the fact that it is impossible to define abstractly what is "local" and what is not. Moreover, the accidents of history—above all the great compromises by which the federal system was created in

1787—have had to be taken as fixed features of the situation. The problem has been further aggravated by the fact that party politicians have always been able to make political capital from mixing state and national politics with local ones.

The first two readings of this section show the complexity of local, state, and federal relations at the present time. Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, who describe the government of New York City, and Morton Grodzins, who presents a paradigm of federal and state impacts on the local scene, both use the term "shared functions" and emphasize the unreality of any notion of a strict "division of powers." The early historical developments leading to this complexity are described by Frank J. Goodnow in an excerpt from one of the first (1904) textbooks on city government. He shows how the centralization that characterized local government in Colonial times was replaced by extreme decentralization in the period of Jacksonian democracy; how the sphere of municipal activity grew and how local government changed from an organization for the satisfaction of local needs to one that was also, and primarily, an agent of state government; and how the legislatures interfered with the cities for political reasons, thus engendering a long and largely unavailing struggle by them for "home rule." (For a definition of this term, see the Glossary). The readings that follow bring his account up to date. Home Rule is evaluated in the light of present circumstances by a committee of practical men, the Chicago Home Rule Commission, who conclude that what is a proper distribution of powers between cities and states is at bottom a political question and must therefore remain unsettled. In their discussion of "the problem of the stable majority" (something that would not have seemed a problem at all to Aristotle!) the anonymous authors of the Note from the *Harvard Law Review* show that state courts have not hesitated to interfere in the operation of local government when they thought minority interests needed protection. Recently (1968) the Supreme Court of the United States has also taken a hand in the organization of local government. In *Avery v. Midland County, Tex.*, it says that the principle of "one man, one vote" applies to local as well as to state elections. A city, town, or county, it says, "may no more deny the equal protection of the laws than it may abridge freedom of speech, establish an official religion, arrest without probable cause, or deny due process of the law." How the central cities and the suburbs have been affected by the court's earlier application of the "one man, one vote" rule to the apportionment of state legislatures is analyzed by William J. D. Boyd.

The rapid growth of the suburbs has brought to the fore the question of how to cope with problems that are in some sense metropolitan. In 1965 there were 224 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (see Glossary); in no case do the boundaries of an SMSA, or indeed of a metropolitan area otherwise defined, coincide with those of a general-

purpose government. So long as this is the case area-wide needs must be met, if they are to be met at all, by cooperation among general-purpose governments having local jurisdictions and by special-purpose ones having area-wide jurisdictions.

The most common way of dealing with metropolitan problems has been by the creation of special districts. These, as John C. Bollens explains, usually have only one function—for example, water supply, sewage disposal, rapid transit, or air pollution control. If it has only one or two functions, a special district cannot possibly plan comprehensively for metropolitan area development.

Many proposals have been made for a multifunctional approach. But what functions are to be considered "metropolitan" rather than "local"? Oliver P. Williams, Harold Herman, Charles S. Liebman, and Thomas R. Dye analyze this question very acutely. Edward C. Banfield and Morton Grodzins think that the importance, as well as the number, of metropolitan problems has been somewhat exaggerated and that in any case sweeping reforms are politically out of the question. Their proposal for action—a realistic one, they say—is based on the assumption that the formal structure of government will in most places remain essentially unchanged for a long time to come. Luther Gulick, a former city administrator of New York and President of the Institute for Public Administration, believes that metropolitan reorganization is one of the urgent needs of the day. He finds more metropolitan (as opposed to local) problems than do Banfield and Grodzins and he is more sanguine than they about the political possibilities of change; accordingly he is led to propose creation of an altogether new level of local government.

In the final reading of this section Robert H. Connery and Richard H. Leach put forward their view of the proper role of the Federal government in metropolitan affairs and make some observations on the trend of federal-local relations. It is interesting that Goodnow, writing about sixty years before them, remarked that nothing need be said about the federal government, since it had no connection with city affairs.

ing and experience in the government problems of metropolitan areas. One of the reasons American agriculture has made the great strides it has in less than a century is that the federal government has recognized its importance by recruiting thousands of agricultural specialists. To date, not even the beginnings of anything comparable have been developed for metropolitan needs, although almost two-thirds of the population of the United States now live in metropolitan areas. The federal government does not lack skilled engineers to build urban highways or airports to serve urban areas, but it does lack personnel who are skilled in the general problems of urban government. Special urban units should be established and those already in existence should be strengthened in the federal agencies whose programs particularly concern metropolitan areas.

One of the structural changes which are needed is the establishment of a staff agency to furnish the President with continuous staff assistance on metropolitan problems. Stated briefly, a Council on Metropolitan Areas should be established by statute in the Executive Office of the President. The Council should consist of three to five full-time members, one of whom should be designated as chairman and be assigned broad administrative authority over the work of the Council. In addition to such day-to-day duties as the President might assign it, the Council should organize a program of continuing research on the impact of federal programs on metropolitan areas. Though the Council should have no authority to co-ordinate federal programs, it should have power to collect data, ask questions, and make recommendations to the President. It should keep abreast of developments in the field through the device of regional desks rather than by means of permanently established field offices. An advisory group representing private research bodies as well as state and local governmental units and interested professional groups should be appointed to consult with the Council in the performance of its duties.

The federal government's program for metropolitan areas should be firmly anchored in the structure of Congress as well as in the White House. This can best be accomplished by requiring the President to submit an annual report to Congress on metropolitan problems, just as he does on the economic state of the nation, and by creating an appropriate Committee on Metropolitan Problems to which the President's report could be referred for study and action. These devices have been used successfully with regard to economic matters, and they could be used with equal success here. The creation of such a committee, however, should not deter the present House Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations (the Fountain Subcommittee) from continuing its studies of intergovernmental problems in general, with special attention to the important problem of federal-state relations.

### III

## The Machine and Its Reform

A "MACHINE" is a party organization held together and motivated by desire for personal gain rather than by political principle or ideology. To the poor in the slums, who are its chief support at the polls, it is a source of jobs, petty favors, and protection. To its precinct and ward workers, it is a source of soft jobs, careers in minor elective office, and favors—an "in"—at city hall. To the few who control it, it is a way of making money.

Perhaps the machine should be spoken of in the past tense. Chicago is the only large city still run by one, and (as a reading in Section V shows) the character of that machine is changing rapidly. Fragments of machines survive in various stages of deterioration in many cities. Some of these have a good deal of vitality and power, even though not enough to take control of the city, and it is not altogether out of the question that a change of conditions—the onset of a major depression, for example—might return them to power in a few central cities where the number of low-income Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and white hillbillies is very large. As a general phenomenon of urban politics, however, the machine is a thing of the past. The immediate causes of its decline were the introduction of merit systems (which eliminated most of the patronage at the disposal of the bosses), full employment and rising national income (which vastly depreciated the value of such patronage as remained),

